Climate change helplessness and the (de)moralization of individual energy behavior by Salomon, Erika et al.
CLIMATE CHANGE HELPLESSNESS 1
Running head: CLIMATE CHANGE HELPLESSNESS
Climate Change Helplessness and the (De)moralization of Individual Energy Behavior
CLIMATE CHANGE HELPLESSNESS 2
Abstract
Although most people understand the threat of climate change, they do little to modify their own 
energy conservation behavior. One reason for this gap between belief and behavior may be that 
individual actions seem un-impactful and therefore are not morally relevant. This research 
investigates how climate change helplessness—belief that one’s actions cannot affect climate 
change—can undermine the moralization of climate change and personal energy conservation. In 
Study 1, climate change efficacy predicted both moralization of energy use and energy 
conservation intentions beyond individual belief in climate change. In Studies 2 and 3, 
participants read information about climate change that varied in efficacy message, that is, 
whether individual actions (e.g., using less water, turning down heat) make a difference in the 
environment. Participants who read that their behavior made no meaningful impact reported 
weaker moralization and intentions (Study 2), and reported more energy consumption one week 
later (Study 3). Moreover, effects on intentions and actions were mediated by changes in 
moralization. We discuss ways to improve climate change messages to foster environmental 
efficacy and moralization of personal energy use. 
Keywords: climate change, helplessness, moralization, efficacy
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Climate Change Helplessness and the (De)moralization of Individual Energy Behavior
The majority of Americans are now convinced that human-caused climate change is real 
and that its effects will be felt in their lifetimes (Gallup, 2013). Still, most people do little to 
translate their concern into concrete behavior (Poortinga, Steg, & Vlek, 2004). Making matters 
worse, people generally do not see energy use as moral issue (Kurz, Donaghue, Rapely, & 
Walker, 2005; Markowitz, 2012), which may be key to disengaging from conservation and 
environmental behaviors (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). We argue here that climate change 
moralization and action is impeded by climate change helplessness—the belief that climate 
change is beyond personal control. Though people generally believe in climate change and are 
concerned about the threat, there is a psychological disconnect between individual actions and 
their consequences for climate change that prevents people from seeing their own energy 
behavior as morally relevant. Climate change helplessness lowers intentions toward energy 
conservation by demoralizing individual efforts to conserve energy. However, climate change 
helplessness may be overcome if people view individual behaviors as impactful on the 
environment (climate change efficacy) and so meaningfully affecting their own and others’ 
welfare. Climate change helplessness can demoralize individual efforts to conserve energy, but 
climate change efficacy re-moralizes individual efforts to conserve energy and thereby increases 
individual motivation to prevent climate change. 
Climate Change Helplessness and Efficacy
Climate change is a grave threat to humankind on a greater scale than any other we have 
faced in our history. Scientists predict that climate change will bring stronger and deadlier storms, 
disease, drought, and food shortages within the coming decades and urge the public to reduce 
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their personal energy use to prevent the worst-case climate scenarios (EPA, 2014; IPCC, 2014). 
But ironically, the gravity of the threat may be too great for people to believe their actions matter. 
That is, people experience climate change helplessness and so fail to see the harmful effects of 
their actions. We borrow the term helplessness from the literature on learned helplessness, as 
they share key attributes. Helplessness is best characterized by behavioral inhibition in response 
to the threat of negative events beyond personal control (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978; Fosco & Geer, 1971; Hiroto, 1974; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975). For example, Seligman and 
colleagues first observed learned helplessness in dogs who were exposed to uncontrollable 
electric shocks (e.g., Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 1967). The dogs quickly 
learned that their actions were futile and instead of trying to escape would just lie down, accept 
the shocks, and cry. 
Climate change shares these fundamental features of the helpless situation: the prospect 
of extreme negative outcomes that seem beyond personal control. The size of the problem of 
climate change feels wholly unmatched to the size of our individual actions. It is hard to imagine, 
for example, that turning up the air conditioning on a hot day has anything to do with the average 
global temperature and its harmful consequences for life on our planet. Even when we do make 
energy-conscious choices, the true effects of our actions are invisible to us: we do not see the 
droughts prevented or the lives saved by our personal energy conservation. Instead, we are 
bombarded with ever more severe warnings about the devastation that climate change will 
bring—such as the string of alarming headlines (“Climate change: We have no solution yet” 
[Samuelson, 2014], “The Heat Is On: In the U.S., Climate Change Is Here and Now and the 
Future” [Plait, 2014]) in the wake of the 2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment (Melillo, 
Richmond, & Yohe, 2014). Like Seligman’s dogs, those who believe climate change is 
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unstoppable may be prepared to just lie down and take it, rather than act to prevent the negative 
consequences. 
But on the bright side, this also suggests that climate change helplessness may be 
overcome by drawing a closer connection between individual actions and their effects on climate 
change—climate change efficacy. People are less likely to take action on issues if they feel little 
personal efficacy over the problem (Strecher, DeVellis, Becker, & Rosenstock, 1986) but are 
more likely to take action if they believe that actions are effective, i.e., both easy to enact and 
likely to produce desired results (Ajzen, 1985; 1991; Bandura, 1977; 1994; Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Research in the health domain, for example, has shown that people are more likely to intend to 
change behavior (e.g., quitting smoking, using condoms) if they are convinced that their 
behavior can actually improve their health outcomes (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Witte, 1994). 
Likewise for climate change behaviors, if people believe their own energy use makes a 
difference in preventing climate change, they should be more likely to take those preventative 
actions and reduce personal energy use (Fielding & Head, 2012). Thus, interventions targeting 
the apparent ineffectiveness of individual action against climate change may be key to undoing 
the paralyzing effects of climate change helplessness.
Moralization and Demoralization 
We argue that climate change helplessness can arise because it is difficult for people to 
see the effects of their individual actions on the greater problem. But further, climate change 
helplessness also carries implications for the moralization of individual behavior. Moralization is 
the process by which an issue is imbued with moral value—ideas about right vs. wrong behavior 
that carry implications for how one should behave and their associated moral judgments. Climate 
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change carries terrible potential for destruction and is therefore an issue ripe for moralization 
through judgments of harm caused by energy waste (for a discussion of other barriers to 
moralization of climate change, see Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). Harm to others (e.g., pain, 
injury, death, property loss) is central to most theories of morality and an important source of 
moral judgment (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Kohlberg, 1969; 
Nucci, 1981; Piaget 1932/1965; Shweder, 1990; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). For example, 
acts thought to help or harm others (e.g., reckless driving) are more likely to be seen as moral 
(Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray et al., 2012) and evoke stronger moral judgment (Young & Saxe, 
2011; Uhlmann & Zhu, 2014). Unchecked, climate change will subject billions of people to 
death, disease, and loss of livable land. If one’s actions are believed to make a genuine impact on 
the environment, it is understood that this impact is either destructive or constructive to others’ 
welfare. In other words, if actions make a difference, then those actions make a moral difference. 
Moralization may therefore play a key meditational role between climate change 
helplessness/ efficacy and the motivation to conserve energy. Across various social issues, 
people are more likely to vote (Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008), to 
devote political and scientific resources (Rozin, 1999), and to advocate for change even against 
their material interests (Effron & Miller, 2012; Skitka & Morgan, 2014) for issues that carry 
greater moral meaning. Moralization of such issues has social consequences as well—for 
example, distancing oneself from others who do not share one’s values (Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005; Skitka et al., 2013; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008) and censuring those who fail 
to act morally (Rozin, 1999). Likewise, getting people to moralize their own actions can be a 
powerful motivator to changing individual behaviors that impact climate change. In other 
contexts, ratings of “moral obligation” predict intentions to perform energy conservation 
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behavior (Markowitz, 2012), and moralizing environmental issues influences people to shift their 
attitudes (Feinberg, & Willer, 2013), take action (Stern, 2000; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2011; Whitmarsh, 2009), and support pro-environmental policies (Poortinga et al., 2004; Nilsson, 
von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004). But moralization of an issue will only occur to the extent that 
people believe their behavior can actually harm or help others (Gray et al., 2012; Young & Saxe, 
2011), i.e., that their actions are effective and make a real difference. Without such belief, people 
can morally disengage from their actions and can more easily justify selfish behavior (Bandura, 
1999). Climate change helplessness obscures the causal connection between personal energy 
waste and its harmful effects, robbing it of its moral value. But climate change efficacy 
illuminates the harm caused by personal energy use and so moralizes and motivates individual 
efforts to conserve energy and prevent climate change.
This also model departs from previous work on learned helplessness in considering the 
special role of moralization. In classic helplessness scenarios, moralization plays no role in 
behavior or motivation because the consequences of (in)action affect only the self. For example, 
when Seligman’s dogs learned to helplessly take shocks they could have controlled, they caused 
themselves pain, but no one else was hurt by their inactions. Likewise, efficacy itself should not 
be enough to moralize any given behavior without additional implications for that behavior, such 
as harm to others. This is where climate change actions depart from those considered in the 
learned helplessness literature. If people fail to act against climate change, millions (or even 
billions) of people will be lose their homes and livelihoods and be victims of hunger, disease, 
and death. In this way, climate change helplessness acts as a double-whammy against motivation 
to conserve personal energy use: it not only severs the cognitive link directly between actions 
and outcomes (as in classic helplessness) but also blinds people to the harmful consequences that 
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would add moral fuel to action. Increasing the apparent efficacy of individual energy 
conservation behaviors to harm others should moralize climate change and energy conservation 
and, in turn, motivate people to conserve.
These ideas—that climate change helplessness demotivates individual energy 
conservation by demoralizing those actions—are tested in the present research. 
The Present Research
These studies investigate climate change helplessness as an obstacle to energy 
conservation behavior and how it may be overcome by an emphasis on the impact of individual 
actions. Further, we investigate the key role of moralization as a mediator between helplessness/ 
efficacy beliefs and energy conservation behavior. To believe that one is helpless against climate 
change means that one’s own actions do not matter—to either harm or help others—and so do 
not have a moral impact. But belief in the efficacy of personal actions imbues those actions with 
moral value and so increases motivation to perform them. 
Important, we focus here on the power of individual or personal efficacy beliefs toward 
climate change (Bandura, 2000), rather than collective efficacy. Climate change is a global 
problem that requires the combined actions of millions of individuals working together, so we 
recognize it may also be improved by collective efficacy (van der Linden, Maibach, & 
Leiserwitz, 2015). But we focus here on personal efficacy beliefs as a way to moralize personal 
actions. 
We make an analogy to learned helplessness as a model for climate change helplessness, 
but we note that there are also differences from classic helplessness theory. Classical learned 
helplessness is acquired when one tries and fails to control a negative stimulus, such as an 
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electric shock. Climate change helplessness does not rely on this kind of direct behavioral 
feedback. Instead, people may infer that their behavior would be ineffective simply from the 
overwhelming nature of the problem. 
From this theory we derive three hypotheses. First, belief that individual actions against 
climate change are effective will predict seeing climate change and energy conservation behavior 
in a moral light. Second, belief in the efficacy of individual behavior will predict motivation to 
perform those behaviors. Finally, we predict that moralization will mediate the link between 
efficacy and motivation. We test these predictions in three studies. Study 1 measured the 
correlational relationships among various climate change attitudes, including climate change 
efficacy, belief in climate change, moralization of climate change, and intentions to conserve 
energy. Study 2 tested the causal relationships among these variables by manipulating an 
efficacy message, i.e., whether individual actions (using less water, turning down the heat) make 
a meaningful difference in the local environment, and measuring climate change moralization 
and intentions to conserve energy. Study 3 extended this design to observe changes in energy use 
and moralization over time. Energy use behavior was measured at two times: (1) immediately 
following the message and (2) one week later. Data, manipulations, and measures from these 
studies are available for download from https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/cch. 
STUDY 1
Individuals may vary in the extent they believe they are personally effective against 
climate change, moralize climate change actions, and are motivated toward those actions. The 
goal of Study 1 was to examine the relationships among these variables. We expect that climate 
change efficacy should predict greater moralization and intentions, even when controlling for 
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other related variables such as overall belief in climate change, negative emotions toward climate 
change, and political conservatism. We further expect that moralization will mediate the 
relationship between climate change efficacy and intentions. Climate change actions (e.g., 
conserving energy) should be moralized to the extent they are believed to be effective (i.e., make 
a difference on the environment), and this moralization should predict motivation to perform 
these actions. 
Method
Participants. 145 participants (70 men; 75 women; Mage = 33.7) were recruited from 
Amazon’s MTurk service for a small fee. Five additional participants were tested but excluded 
for duplicate or non-US IP addresses.1
Measures. Participants completed five scales to assess various climate change attitudes, 
each measured on 7-point scales. First, participants completed a 7-item Climate Change Beliefs 
scale (adapted from Sinatra, Kardash, Taasoobshirazi, & Lombardi, 2011; α = .93) that measured 
belief in human-caused climate change (e.g., “Scientific evidence points to a warming trend in 
global climate”; “Global warming presents a serious threat to human life”; 1 = strongly disagree; 
7 = strongly agree). Second, the four-item Climate Change Efficacy scale (α = .95) assessed 
feelings of personal climate change efficacy (e.g., “How effective is individual effort in 
combating climate change?”; “How much control do individuals have over climate change?”; 
scales varied by item content, but 1 represented low control and 7 represented high control for all 
1Note on sample size. For all studies, it was our goal to obtain an adequate sample size to reliably detect an effect of 
efficacy beliefs, erring on side of more participants where possible. It is important to note that norms around sample 
sizes in psychology have been changing rapidly in recent years and have affected what members of our laboratory 
consider an optimal sample size. The studies reported here were conducted over several years in the following order: 
Pilot Study, Study 3, Study 1, Study 2. Thus, what we viewed as reasonable sample and effect sizes evolved with the 
changing norms in our discipline and as we observed the effects in these studies. So we began this project with 
comparatively smaller samples in the earlier studies and increased sample sizes as time passed.
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items). Third, participants completed a 5-item Negative Emotions scale (α = .80; e.g., “How 
severe is climate change?”; “How scary is global warming?”; scales varied by item content, but 1 
represented low negativity and 7 represented high negativity for all items).2 Fourth, participants 
completed the 12-item Energy Conservation Intentions scale (α = .86), which measured 
intentions to perform energy conservation actions such as using a driving less and using a 
clothesline instead of a dryer over the following year (1 = not at all; 7 = definitely). And fifth, 
participants completed the 11-item Climate Change Moralization scale (α = .90) that measured 
the extent to which they saw climate change individual energy conservation as moral issues (e.g., 
“Preventing global warming protects others’ rights”; “Using too much energy is morally wrong”; 
1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Finally, participants answered demographic questions, 
including a single item measure of Political Conservatism (1 = very liberal; 7 = very 
conservative) and were debriefed. 
Results
We scored each of the scales by averaging responses to all items. Overall, the scales were 
positively correlated with one another (.40 < rs < .72) and negatively correlated with Political 
Conservatism (-.48 < rs < -.23). Despite these intercorrelations, none of the predictors in our 
models showed variance inflation factors higher than 2.05, suggesting that multicolinearity was 
not a problem for the models we fit. Means for each of these scales are presented in Table 1. See 
the supplemental materials for intercorrelations (Table S1) among the measured variables.
Our central question here was whether climate change efficacy would predict 
2 In Study 1 only, this scale included an item, “How helpless do you feel about climate change?”, that measured 
participants’ feelings of helplessness, rather than their apparent lack of control over climate change. This item 
correlated strongly with the Negative Emotion scale (corrected item-scale correlation: r = .39) and so was included 
in its average. Removing this item from the scale does not affect our conclusions. 
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moralization of energy use and intentions to conserve, and if moralization might explain 
efficacy’s relationship with increased motivation to conserve. We report the results of these 
analyses below. Confidence intervals (95%) are presented in brackets. Full regression tables for 
these analyses are available in Tables S5 and S6 in the supplemental materials.
Moralization. If climate change helplessness reduces moral concern about the 
consequences of global warming, then conversely, belief in personal climate change efficacy 
should be associated with moralization of those behaviors. We tested three linear regression 
models predicting Climate Change Moralization scores from Climate Change Efficacy scores. 
First, Efficacy predicted Moralization when entered into a model alone (β = .59 [.45, .72], t(143) 
= 8.66, p < .001). Further, we predicted that this relationship should not be explained by general 
belief in climate change, political attitudes or other potential third variables. Our results were 
consistent with this prediction. Efficacy predicted Moralization when Climate Change Belief was 
added as an additional predictor (β = .43 [.30, .56], t(143) = 6.42, p < .001). Efficacy also 
remained a significant predictor in a third model when controlling for Climate Change Belief, 
Negative Emotion, and Political Conservatism (β = .27 [.13, .40], t(143) = 4.00, p < .001). 
Intentions. If climate change helplessness acts as a barrier to environmentally conscious 
action, climate change efficacy should be positively related to intentions to conserve energy. 
This is indeed what we found. Efficacy predicted Intentions when entered into a model as the 
sole predictor (β = .42 [.27, .57], t(143) = 5.58, p < .001). This relationship remained significant 
in a second model, when Climate Change Belief scores were entered as an additional predictor (β 
= .30 [.14, .45], t(143) = 3.76, p < .001). Moreover, Efficacy remained a significant predictor in a 
third model when controlling for Climate Change Belief, Negative Emotion, and Political 
Conservatism (β = .18 [.01, .35], t(143) = 2.12, p = .04).
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But more than the simple relationship between perceived efficacy and motivation, we 
predicted that moralization mediates the relationship between personal efficacy and motivation. 
We tested this prediction by estimating the indirect effect of Climate Change Efficacy on Energy 
Conservation Intentions through Climate Change Moralization via product-of-coefficients 
implemented in the PROCESS module for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Using 5,000 bootstrap 
resamplings, the mediating relationship was estimated to be significant (indirect effect = 0.27 
[0.17, 0.39], SE = 0.05; see Figure 1). This effect remained significant when Climate Change 
Beliefs, Negative Emotion and Political Conservatism were added as covariates (indirect effect = 
0.10 [0.05, 0.19], SE = 0.04). The results of this mediation analysis are consistent with our claim 
that moralization is a critical mechanism for increasing the motivation to act against climate 
change.
[Figure 1 about here]
Discussion
As predicted, Study 1 found evidence that climate change helplessness is associated with 
demoralization of individual energy use and, in turn, lack of motivation to act against climate 
change. People who felt more personal efficacy toward climate change reported stronger 
intention to conserve energy, a relationship that was explained by their moralization of those 
behaviors. Often climate change campaigns target the public belief in climate change, with the 
assumption that getting people to accept the realities of climate change should result in more 
action. But these findings suggest that the moral value of climate change behaviors may be 
critical to convincing the public to conserve. However, the present results are correlational, and 
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so we cannot yet make conclusions abut the causal relationship between efficacy beliefs, 
moralization, and behavior. In Study 2, we test whether we can directly change moralization and 
intentions through messages that promote individual efficacy. 
STUDY 2
Study 1 found that individual differences in feelings of control over climate change 
predicted moralization of energy use and intentions to conserve energy. In Study 2, we tested the 
causal influence of efficacy beliefs on moralization and intentions by manipulating apparent 
individual control over climate change. Participants read articles on climate change that framed 
individual actions as either effective and impactful (High Efficacy) or ineffective and un-
impactful (Low Efficacy). We predict that the High Efficacy message will increase moralization 
and intentions relative to the Low Efficacy message, as people would see a stronger connection 
between their own actions and the harmful effects on others. Moreover, we predict that 
moralization will mediate the effect of Efficacy message on intentions. 
Method
Participants. Data collection for Study 2 was conducted in two waves. In the first wave, 
301 participants were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk service for a small fee; 9 were excluded 
for duplicate or non-US IP addresses, leaving N = 292 participants. After analysis of this initial 
wave, data were collected from an additional 151 participants, 7 of whom were excluded due for 
duplicate or non-US IP addresses. This resulted in a full sample of 452 participants (196 men; 
240 women; Mage = 36.0). Because of the danger of inflated Type I error rates when data sets are 
augmented in this way (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), we report an additional statistic, 
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paugmented, that provides a 95% confidence interval for the Type I error rate of each test (Sagarin, 
Ambler, & Lee, 2014).
Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to a High or Low Efficacy condition. 
All participants were told the study was about science communication and that they would read a 
short science article and answer some questions. The science article described the issue of 
climate change and consisted of two paragraphs. Paragraph 1 described facts about climate 
change. Paragraph 2 manipulated Efficacy Message. Individual action was described as either 
easy to implement and having a strong impact on personal carbon emissions (High Efficacy), or 
as difficult to implement and having almost no impact on global carbon emissions (Low 
Efficacy). 
Measures. Following the article, a manipulation check item asked participants to rate the 
effectiveness of individual action against climate change on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all 
effective; 7 = very effective). Next, participants completed four of the measures from Study 1: a 
four-item version of the Negative Emotion scale and the Climate Change Beliefs scale, Energy 
Conservation Intentions scale, and Climate Change Moralization scale. They also completed a 
7-item Climate Change Policies scale, on which they indicated with yes/no responses their 
support for seven different policies designed to reward energy conservation (e.g., “Tax credits 
for purchasing hybrid and electric vehicles”) or punish energy waste (e.g., “A fee for each 
disposable plastic shopping bag used”). This scale measured endorsement for policies aimed to 
change behaviors of society, not the individual. We were interested in whether moral 
prescriptions would influence support for governmental intervention in others’ behavior, but we 
made no specific predictions for this scale. Finally, participants answered demographic questions 
and were debriefed. 
CLIMATE CHANGE HELPLESSNESS 16
Results
We scored the Negative Emotions (α = .88), Climate Change Beliefs (α = .94), Climate 
Change Moralization (α = .92), and Energy Conservation Intentions (α = .86) scales as in Study 1 
and summed the number of yes responses to the Climate Change Policies scale (i.e., the total 
number of policies supported) for each participant (α = .72). Means for each of these variables 
are presented in Table 1. Their intercorrelations are reported in the supplemental materials (Table 
S2).
Efficacy manipulation check. As expected, participants who read the High Efficacy 
message rated personal actions as more effective against climate change (M = 4.96, SD = 1.59) 
than did participants who read the Low Efficacy message (M = 3.37, SD = 1.93, t(434) = 9.43, p 
< .001, paugmented = [.05, .05], d = 0.90 [0.71, 1.10]), indicating the Efficacy manipulation was 
successful. 
Climate change beliefs. We predicted that efficacy should have a motivational—not 
informational—effect on attitudes and so did not expect any effects on Climate Change Beliefs. 
No effects were observed for Efficacy condition (t(434) = 1.03, p = .31, paugmented = [.62, .31], d = 
0.10 [-0.09, 0.29]).
Negative emotions. Participants in the Low Efficacy condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.48) 
reported marginally less Negative Emotions about climate change than those in the High 
Efficacy condition (M = 5.23, SD = 1.41, t(434) = 1.74, p = .08, paugmented = [.10, .10], d = 0.17 [-
0.02, 0.35]).
Moralization of energy use. We predicted that high efficacy messages would lead to 
greater moralization of climate change behaviors. There was a significant effect of Efficacy on 
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moralization (t(434) = 2.94, p = .004, paugmented = [.05, .05], d = 0.28 [0.09, 0.47]), such that 
participants in the High Efficacy condition (M = 4.76, SD = 1.33) moralized energy use more 
than participants in the Low Efficacy condition (M = 4.40, SD = 1.26). This difference remained 
significant in a regression model predicting standardized Climate Change Moralization scores 
from standardized Climate Change Beliefs, standardized Negative Emotions, standardized 
Political Conservatism, and effect coded condition (-0.5 = Low Efficacy, 0.5 = High Efficacy, b 
= 0.18 [0.04, 0.29], t(431) = 2.55, p = .01, paugmented = [.06, .05], see Table S6 in the supplemental 
materials).
Intentions to conserve energy. We further predicted that those who read the High 
Efficacy message would report stronger intentions to conserve energy than those who read the 
Low Efficacy message. We observed a significant effect of Efficacy condition (t(434) = 3.21, p = 
.001, paugmented = [.05, .05], d = 0.31 [0.12, 0.50]). As expected, those who read the High Efficacy 
message (M = 4.85, SD = 1.21) formed stronger intentions to conserve energy than those who 
read the Low Efficacy message (M = 4.48, SD = 1.22). This difference remained significant in a 
regression model predicting standardized Energy Conservation Intentions scores from 
standardized Climate Change Beliefs, standardized Negative Emotions, standardized Political 
Conservatism, and effect coded condition (b = 0.21 [0.06, 0.35], t(431) = 2.80, p = .005, paugmented 
= [.06, .05], see Table S7 in the supplemental materials). 
We again used indirect path analysis to test our prediction that efficacy messages increase 
motivation to conserve energy through moralization of energy use. Using 5,000 bootstrap 
resamplings, the mediating relationship was estimated to be significant (indirect effect = 0.22 
[0.08, 0.38], SE = 0.07; see Figure 1) and remained significant when controlling for Climate 
Change Beliefs, Negative Emotions, and Political Conservatism (indirect effect = 0.08 [0.02, 
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0.16], SE = 0.03). 
Support for energy policies. We included a Climate Change Policies scale as a measure 
of support for collective response to climate change but made no specific prediction for the 
results. There were no differences in the number of energy policies supported between the High 
and Low Efficacy conditions (t(434) = 0.33, p = .75, paugmented = [1.49, .74], d = 0.03 [-0.16, 
0.22]), even when standardized and regressed on standardized Climate Change Beliefs, 
standardized Negative Emotions, standardized Political Conservatism, and effect coded 
condition (b = -0.04 [-0.20, 0.11], t(431) = -0.55, p = .58, paugmented = [1.17, .58], see Table S8 in 
the supplemental materials). This is unsurprising given our focus on individual efficacy and its 
implications for personal—not collective—moralization and action.
Discussion
Study 2 provided support for our causal predictions about climate change helplessness. 
Namely, climate change efficacy motivates individual intentions to conserve energy (at least in 
part) by enhancing the moral value of those actions. Participants who read the High Efficacy 
climate change message indeed believed their individual actions made more impact, were more 
likely to moralize personal energy use, and had stronger intentions to conserve energy. Efficacy 
message did not affect endorsement of social policies. But because we focus here on individual 
efficacy, not collective efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 2000), we would not necessarily expect to 
motivate collective action, as social policies aim to do, and we found no difference in policy 
support. Efficacy message also had no effect on climate change belief—people who read high vs. 
low efficacy information were no more or less likely to believe in human-caused climate change. 
We did not expect efficacy to affect belief that climate change is real, only the belief that 
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personal actions make a difference on climate change. This also highlights that absolute belief/ 
denial of climate change is not always the best predictor of motivation to prevent climate change. 
Rather, motivation also requires the expectation that actions can make a difference (efficacy). 
But most important, these results show the impact of efficacy message on intention was mediated 
by moralization—efficacy message increased the moralization of individual actions, and this in 
turn increased intentions. These results suggest that a focus on personal efficacy may be 
promising antidote to climate change helplessness and also demonstrate the key role of moral 
attitudes in motivating action. 
STUDY 3
In Study 2, messages that emphasized the effect of individual action on the environment 
led to greater moralization of climate change and stronger personal motivation to conserve 
energy. Do these intentions and moralizations translate to conservation behavior? Study 3 
investigated whether climate change efficacy could impact individuals’ actions in a one-week 
period after reading a climate change message. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions, Low Efficacy, High Efficacy, and a Control condition with no efficacy 
information. Participants completed the same measures as in Study 2, but we also included a 
measure of energy conservation behavior. Follow-up measures were completed one week after 
initial testing. We predict that efficacy message will improve energy conservation behavior 
reported one week later (Time 2), mediated by the moralization and intentions reported at Time 1. 
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Method
296 (130 men; 165 women; 1 not reporting gender; Mage = 35.3) participants were 
recruited through MTurk for a small payment at Time 1. Nine additional participants were 
excluded for non-US IP addresses. 221 (95 men; 126 women; 1 not reporting gender; Mage = 
35.2) participants returned to complete the second survey at Time 2, an average of 8.23 days 
later, for an additional payment.3 At Time 1, participants were randomly assigned to read one of 
three articles about climate change. All participants first read a single paragraph describing 
climate change as a scientific topic. In the High Efficacy and Low Efficacy conditions, this 
paragraph was followed by the High/ Low Efficacy message, as in Study 2. Those assigned to 
the Control condition did not receive additional information. All participants then completed 
climate change measures from Studies 1 and 2 and an additional Energy Use scale consisting of 
10 questions (e.g., “Compared to a typical week, did you drive more or fewer miles this week?”) 
with seven-point response scales (1 = many fewer/much less than normal; 7 = many/much more 
than normal). One week later, all participants were invited by email to complete the second part 
of the study. This second survey included the same measures as Time 1 and asked participants to 
rate four statements about general motivation to conserve energy (e.g., “I have made an effort to 
conserve energy in the last week”) on seven-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree).
Results
We scored the Climate Change Beliefs (Time 1: α = .93; Time 2: α = .92), Negative 
3Attrition did not differ among conditions (χ2 (2, N = 296) = 0.10, p = .95), with 25, 27, and 23 participants lost in 
the Low Efficacy, Control, and High Efficacy conditions, respectively. There were no differences on any of the 
Time 1 outcome variables between those who completed the second survey and those who did not (ts ≤ 1.64, ps ≥ 
.10)
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Emotions (Time 1: α = .85; Time 2: α = .90), Intentions (Time 1: α = .84; Time 2: α = .81), 
Moralization (Time 1: α = .89; Time 2: α = .91), and Climate Change Policies (Time 1: α = .71; 
Time 2: α = .65) scales as in Studies 1 and 2. We coded responses to the behavior items so that 
higher scores indicated greater energy conservation (and lower scores indicated greater energy 
waste) and calculated a mean for each participant (Time 1: α = .42; Time 2: α = .60).4 We 
averaged the four items about motivation to conserve energy given at Time 2 to create a 
composite score for each participant (α = .88). Means for each of the measured variables are 
presented in Table 1. Their intercorrelations are reported in the supplemental materials (Table 
S3). We report results separately for Time 1 and Time 2 below. 
Time 1 manipulation check. Immediately following message exposure, an ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of Condition on the perceived effectiveness of individual action (F(2, 
293) = 31.16, p < .001). Planned contrasts found that the High Efficacy condition raised belief in 
the effectiveness of individual action relative to the Control condition (t(293) = 4.44, p < .001, d 
= 0.64 [0.35, 0.93]), and the Low Efficacy condition reduced this belief relative to the Control 
condition (t(293) = 3.63, p < .001, d = 0.51 [0.23, 0.79]), indicating that the that High and Low 
Efficacy conditions successfully changed participants’ beliefs about the efficacy of individual 
action. Based on these results showing that the High Efficacy, Control, and Low Efficacy 
conditions bear a rank-ordered relationship with the construct they were intended to manipulate, 
we analyzed the remaining measured variables using a rank correlation, Somer’s d.5 This statistic 
is similar to other rank correlations (e.g., Spearman’s ρ, Kendall’s τ) in that it quantifies the 
4 The difference in reliability between time points may be an effect of the manipulation. If participants did not 
initially see the behaviors we asked about (e.g., recycling, water conservation, thermostat usage) as related, the 
behaviors themselves may have had weak correlations. However, after completing a survey in which these behaviors 
are framed as sharing an underlying motivation—energy conservation—participants’ behavior (and responses) may 
have been more consistent across items, leading to stronger inter-item correlations.
5 Contrasts between conditions on the remaining dependent variables are reported in Table S9 in the Supplemental 
Materials.
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association between two ordinal variables with values ranging from –1 to 1. However, unlike 
other rank correlations, Somer’s d is intended to measure a uni-directional, causal relationship 
between an independent and dependent variable (Ferguson, 2009; Pearson, 2010). This is in line 
with our methods and hypotheses: We expect our ordinal manipulation of efficacy (-1 = Low 
Efficacy, 0 = Control, 1 = High Efficacy) to causally influence our dependent variables, though 
this relationship might not be linear due to potentially different strengths of the High and Low 
Efficacy manipulations. Thus, significant positive relationships observed with Somer’s d may be 
interpreted as evidence for a rank-ordered relationship among conditions. Confidence intervals 
(95%) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples are given in brackets.
Time 1 dependent variables. As in Study 2, Condition did not affect belief in climate 
change (Somer’s d = .01 [-.11, .12], p = .90). Nor did it affect ratings of Negative Emotions 
about climate change (Somer’s d = .06 [-.04, .17], p = .24). 
As in Study 2, there was a significant positive effect of Condition on Moralization scores 
(Somer’s d = .15 [.04, .26], p = .005), indicating that higher efficacy messages increased 
moralization of climate change and energy use. To control for Time 1 Climate Change Beliefs, 
Time 1 Negative Emotions, and Political Conservatism, we regressed Climate Change 
moralization on these variables and then subjected the residuals of Climate Change Moralization 
from this model to a Somer’s d analysis with Condition as the independent variable. The effect 
of Condition on Climate Change Moralization remained significant in this analysis (Somer’s d = 
.16 [.06, .27], p = .002). 
Efficacy condition also positively influenced participants’ mean scores on the Energy 
Conservation Intentions scale (Somer’s d = .14 [.03, .25], p = .01), indicating that participants 
who read messages promoting a greater sense of personal efficacy formed stronger intentions to 
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conserve energy. Condition still significantly affected Energy Conservation Intentions when they 
were residualized on Time 1 Climate Change Beliefs, Time 1 Negative Emotions, and Political 
Conservatism (Somer’s d = .16 [.04, .27], p = .006). Bootstrapped (5,000 samples) product-of-
coefficient mediation analyses showed a significant indirect effect of Condition through Climate 
Change Moralization on Energy Conservation Intentions (indirect effect = 0.12 [0.02, 0.23], SE = 
0.05; see Figure 1). This indirect effect was also significant when Climate Change Beliefs, 
Negative Emotions, and Political Conservatism were added as covariates (indirect effect = 0.08 
[0.02, 0.15], SE = 0.03). 
Condition marginally affected the total number of Climate Change Policies supported 
(Somer’s d = .09 [-.01, .19], p = .09). However, this effect was non-significant when Climate 
Change Policies scores were residualized on Time 1 Climate Change Beliefs, Time 1 Negative 
Emotions, and Political Conservatism (Somer’s d = .08 [-.02, .18], p = .11). As in Study 2, 
personal efficacy did not affect support for collective action against climate change. We also did 
not expect any differences in reported behavior in the previous week at Time 1 (before the 
manipulation took place), and there was no relationship observed regardless of whether raw 
scores (Somer’s d = .08 [-.03, .18], p = .15) or scores residualized on Time 1 Climate Change 
Beliefs, Time 1 Negative Emotions, and Political Conservatism (Somer’s d = .07 [-.05, .17], p = 
.24) were used as the dependent variable.
Time 2. One week after message exposure, the effect of condition on perceived 
effectiveness remained positive and significant (Somer’s d = .19 [.07, .32], p = .001), suggesting 
that the manipulation was still active. Condition was again unrelated to Climate Change Beliefs 
(Somer’s d = .01 [–.11, .14], p = .88) and to ratings of Negative Emotions (Somer’s d = .06 [-.06, 
.18], p = .36). The effect of Efficacy condition on Moralization remained positive and significant 
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(Somer’s d = .15 [.03, .26], p = .02), even when these scores were residualized on Time 1 
Climate Change Belief, Time 1 Negative Emotions, and Political Conservatism (Somer’s d = .14 
[.01, .26], p = .03), with participants who read high-efficacy messages reporting greater 
moralization of climate change and energy use one week later. In contrast to Time 1, there was 
no direct effect of condition on Intentions whether raw scores (Somer’s d = .01 [–.12, .14], p = 
.88) or scores residualized on Time 1 Climate Change Beliefs, Time 1 Negative Emotions, and 
Political Conservatism (Somer’s d = -.01 [-.13, .12], p = .92) were used as the dependent variable. 
However, a mediation model examining the indirect effect of condition on Time 2 intentions 
through Time 1 moralization was significant (indirect effect = 0.11 [0.03, 0.23], SE = .05; see 
Figure 1), even when controlling for Time 1 Climate Change Beliefs, Time 1 Negative Emotions, 
and Political Conservatism (indirect effect = 0.07 [0.02, 0.14], SE = .03). There was no effect of 
condition on Time 2 Climate Change Policies whether raw scores (Somer’s d = .04 [–.08, .17], p 
= .50) or scores residualized on Time 1 Climate Change Belief, Time 1 Negative Emotions, and 
Political Conservatism (Somer’s d = .03 [-.10, .15], p = .64) were used as the dependent variable. 
As predicted, Efficacy condition had a positive effect on reported energy conservation 
behavior in the week following the manipulation (Somer’s d = .15 [.03, .27], p = .01), indicating 
that participants who read messages promoting greater efficacy reduced their energy use over the 
following week. This effect remained significant when using Time 2 Energy Conservation 
Behavior scores residualized on Time 1 Climate Change Belief, Time 1 Negative Emotions, and 
Political Conservatism (Somer’s d = .12 [.00, .25], p = .05). 
Our longitudinal design allowed us to test a critical mediation model, examining the 
indirect effect of condition on behavior at Time 2 through moralization and intentions formed at 
Time 1. This model circumvents a common inferential problem of indirect path analyses. When 
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the mediators and dependent variables are measured simultaneously (as in Studies 1 and 2 here), 
causal order cannot be established through indirect path analysis (Kline, 2015). However, by 
measuring behavior one week after intentions and moralization, we are able to establish the 
temporal precedence of our mediators. This path was significant in a bootstrapped (5,000 
samples) product of coefficients analysis (indirect effect = 0.014 [0.003, 0.034], SE = .02; see 
Figure 2) and remained significant when controlling for Time 1 Climate Change Beliefs, Time 1 
Negative Emotions, and Political Conservatism (indirect effect = 0.008 [0.002, 0.022], SE = 
.005). That is, participants who read low efficacy messages moralized climate change less, which 
led them to form weaker intentions to conserve energy and to use more energy over the 
following week. Means across conditions (see Table 1) suggest that the low efficacy message 
may have a stronger effect than the high efficacy message. In other words, climate change 
helplessness may hurt climate change moralization and action more than efficacy helps. 
[Figure 2 about here]
Discussion
Study 3 examined the effect of efficacy messages on attitudes and behavior at two times: 
following initial exposure to the message and one week later. As in Study 2, efficacy messages 
increased the intentions to conserve energy and moralization of climate change at Time 1 
(reported immediately after the manipulation). But most important, measures taken at Time 2 
allowed us to observe changes in self-reported energy behavior, rather than just intentions to 
perform behaviors. This method also allowed a closer examination of moralization as a mediator, 
by observing the effects of moralization at Time 1 and on self-reported behavior at Time 2. 
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Those who read Low Efficacy messages reported greater energy use at Time 2, mediated by 
Time 1 Moralization and Time 1 Intentions. In other words, after people read that their behavior 
has little impact on climate change, they demoralized energy use and dampened their intentions 
to conserve, and subsequently reported more energy use over the following week. 
This provides behavioral evidence that efficacy affects individual climate change actions 
and also addresses the causal relationship between moralization and intentions/ actions more 
directly than Studies 1 and 2. However, there are some limitations to this study. We did not 
assess actual behaviors but self-reported behavior that may be subject to some presentation 
biases and demand characteristics. For example, it is possible that at Time 2 participants recalled 
the materials they had seen at Time 1, and this may motivate them to report behavior consistent 
with the message. However, the broader pattern of results found in the study does not support 
demand characteristics as the primary driver of our results. If recalling reading a high or low 
efficacy message caused participants to respond in ways that confirmed these messages, we 
would expect this to be evident in their support for policies that prohibit others from performing 
these behaviors and in their intentions to perform these behaviors. But, there were no direct 
effects on policy support or intention items at Time 2, suggesting that participants were not 
simply reporting what they thought they should based on the messages they read. 
Overall, we find that participants exposed to higher efficacy messages cast greater moral 
judgment on energy waste and are willing to refrain from it themselves, but they are not willing 
to legally proscribe these behaviors for others. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Climate change is an ominous threat with devastating potential costs to humanity. For 
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this reason, environmental and social leaders such as Al Gore (An Inconvenient Truth, Bender, 
Burns, David, & Guggenheim, 2006) and Pope Francis (Burton, 2014) hope to inspire action 
with impassioned pleas to see climate change as a moral issue. But the moralization of action 
against climate change relies on the belief that actions do have meaningful effects. Climate 
change helplessness obscures the effect of individual actions on the environment and so robs 
those actions of their moral meaning. In three studies, we show that climate change helplessness 
represents a substantial motivational barrier to individual action by demoralizing individual 
energy conservation and waste. In Study 1, people who felt less control over climate change 
were less likely to see climate change as a moral issue and had lower intentions to conserve 
energy. Perhaps climate change helplessness could be overcome by emphasizing the efficacy of 
individual actions on the environment: participants who read high efficacy messages moralized 
their own actions and reported stronger intentions to conserve energy than those who read low 
efficacy messages in Studies 2 and 3. But perhaps low efficacy does more to impede action by 
fostering helplessness than high efficacy does to improve action. People who read low efficacy 
messages translated their apathy into behavior by increasing their reported energy use the 
following the week. 
Role of Moralization
These studies support the idea that climate change efficacy affects motivation for 
personal energy conservation. Moreover, all three studies found evidence that moralization was a 
critical predictor of intentions and conservation behavior, mediating the effects of efficacy. 
Important, we also show this relationship using a longitudinal design in Study 3, where we find 
that moralization at one time point predicts later intentions and behavior. This design overcomes 
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a common criticism of statistical mediation models where the mediator and dependent variable 
are measured at the same time. In such cases, the causal role of the mediator cannot be inferred 
because it cannot be said to precede its supposed effect (Kline, 2015). In contrast, we 
demonstrate the temporal order of variables by measuring the behavioral effects a week later. 
Notably, moralization predicted these outcomes when controlling for effects of belief in 
climate change, and belief in climate change did not differ across efficacy conditions. That is, 
efficacy beliefs moralized the issue, even though people were no more likely to believe that 
climate change is real. This goes against common wisdom that energy conservation can be 
encouraged by addressing belief in climate change. Though awareness of climate change and its 
dangers is certainly important, knowledge itself may not be enough to motivate action (Kellstedt, 
Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008). And even if people do believe and understand the threat of climate 
change, they will not moralize their own behavior if they do not see its consequences. To impact 
individual behavior, climate change messages should also address motivational factors (Reser & 
Swim, 2011), including moralization. Our studies demonstrate the power of simple efficacy 
messages to change moralization. 
This link between efficacy and prescriptive moral norms has been overlooked by 
traditional models of behavior, such as the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 
1991) and expectancy-value theories (e.g., Wigfield & Eccles, 2000; for a similar argument, see 
Sparks & Shepherd, 2002), which propose that efficacy beliefs influence behavior primarily by 
directly increasing intentions to act. In contrast, we propose that moralization is a key mediator 
between efficacy and intentions to prevent climate change. When people see their energy 
behavior as effective against climate change, they recognize its harmful consequences and moral 
implications, improving their motivation to act. 
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We demonstrate that this link occurs within the domain of climate change, but our 
findings may apply to other domains as well. In scenarios typical of the moral psychology 
literature, the efficacy of actions is readily apparent and/ or made explicit by the experimenters. 
For example, in the famous footbridge dilemma, participants are told that pushing a man off a 
bridge will kill him (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001); high efficacy 
is a given. Yet, little is known about whether people moralize actions with low efficacy. For 
example, there is debate over whether a murderer’s skill with a weapon (i.e., his/her 
effectiveness in using it) affects moral judgment (c.f., Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Sousa, & 
Holbrook, 2010). Even less is known about the role of outcome efficacy in moral judgment: 
Does moral judgment vary by whether an attempted murderer uses a highly effective weapon (a 
gun) or a less effective one (a letter opener)? More important, this literature does not speak to the 
generalized mediational role of moralization in linking efficacy to intentions. Future research 
should examine this link by explicitly manipulating the perceived efficacy of individual actions 
and measuring moral attitudes, intentions, and behavioral outcomes in domains beyond climate 
change.
Alternative Routes to Climate Change Moralization
Moralization of climate change may be essential to changing intentions (Feinberg & 
Willer, 2013; Markowitz, 2012). And climate change helplessness may be only one obstacle to 
moralization (Gifford & Nilsson, 2014; Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). Harm is not the only 
criterion people use when deciding whether an action has moral weight (e.g., Graham et al., 
2009), and so activating other moral goals could also increase climate change moralization. For 
example, both climate change and moral values are politically polarized (McCright & Dunlap, 
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2011; Graham et al., 2009). Messages that target conservative audiences might find special moral 
weight in focusing on the particularly conservative value of purity/sanctity (Feinberg & Willer, 
2013; Rottman, Kelemen, & Young, 2015). By addressing other barriers to moralization in 
addition to helplessness, climate change communication might be made even more impactful.
Likewise, insights from the moral disengagement literature (e.g., Bandura, 1999) may 
point to additional paths to moralization. We argue moralization of climate change is hindered 
because people fail to see the causal link between their own energy conservation behaviors and 
the harmful effects of climate change. Making that connection more apparent to people can 
enhance the moralization of those actions and the issue of climate change more generally. But 
even when people do see an issue as moral, they may be motivated to disengage from their 
moralization in order to pursue self-interest (e.g., keeping their homes warmer in the winter; 
Rottman et al., 2015; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). 
Believing individual actions to be ineffective is just one way to morally disengage from 
climate change and justify personal energy consumption. Maintaining the public’s moral eye on 
climate change may require combatting other mechanisms of moral disengagement. For example, 
it may be easy to dehumanize people likely to be harmed by climate change if they live in far off 
places and times and thereby fail to see them as moral patients (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, 
& Pastorelli, 1996; Gray et al., 2012). Likewise, to the extent that energy-wasting behavior can 
be construed as serving a good purpose (e.g., increasing economic well-being through 
manufacturing), people can further justify moral apathy to climate change (Bandura et al., 1996). 
Future research should investigate how to combat these additional mechanisms of moral 
disengagement. For example, emphasizing the availability of alternative energy sources and the 
viability of low-energy solutions to problems may help circumvent these sources of 
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disengagement. 
Increasing energy conscious attitudes in response to climate change will be made easier 
through moralization, and public communication about climate change will need to be mindful 
not only of efficacy but also of additional routes to moralization.
Implications for Research and Application
Aside from the role of moralization, our findings point to some ways that climate change 
messages can be framed to improve energy conservation. In Study 3, we looked at the effects 
that high and low efficacy messages have on moralization, prospective behavioral intentions, and 
self-reported changes in energy conservation behavior one week later. Though high efficacy 
messages had a positive effect on moralization and intentions at Time 1, only low efficacy 
messages appeared to affect behavior one week later. But this does not mean that high efficacy 
messages have no impact. The strength of high efficacy messages may be that they counter the 
typical moral disengagement people experience with climate change helplessness – and that 
without high efficacy messages this disengagement worsens with time. Thus, successfully 
promoting efficacy in the long term may require more than a single intervention to make a 
lasting impact on action. After participating in the study, our participants would have been 
subject to the same bleak public messages and experiences as before the study, potentially 
undoing the positive effects our manipulation. Maintaining high efficacy beliefs may require 
regular ongoing information to reinforce those beliefs. Direct feedback about the impact of 
specific actions could be effective in this regard. For example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART) in the San Francisco area provides riders with feedback on the amount of carbon saved 
for each trip they make. Other built-in feedback systems in home heating and water usage, 
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transportation, and recycling could help to reinforce efficacy beliefs by making individual 
impacts more salient. Climate awareness campaigns could persuade action by pairing messages 
about the potential harms of climate change with specific information about energy used or saved 
by certain activities, thereby directing attention to the moral impact of individual actions. But 
presently, climate change messages often focus on the “big picture” problem (e.g., icecaps 
melting, acidification of oceans, disappearing farm land) in order to demonstrate the importance 
of climate change. This can help highlight the severity of the threat, but too much attention on 
the big picture can obscure the role of the individual. An alternative could be to begin messages 
with the big picture perspective, and then shift to the personal level by showing the significance 
of individual contributions to the whole. The impacts of repeated efficacy messaging and direct 
feedback systems on efficacy beliefs and conservation behavior are important avenues for 
research and application.
Our research used such messages to promote belief in individual efficacy, (i.e., level of 
the person). We also explored whether individual efficacy could motivate collective action (i.e., 
individuals working together) through support for energy policies aimed to curb individual 
energy waste. After all, if one person’s actions can make a difference, that impact increases with 
the actions of many people. But we found no effects on support for these policies. Still, 
collective action will likely be necessary to mitigate the worst outcomes of climate change. 
Collective efficacy can have a profound effect motivating action as part of a social movement 
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997), and future research might explore combining 
information about individual efficacy and collective efficacy as a way of moralizing collective 
solutions to climate change through government and other organizations. 
Efficacy, whether individual or collective, may be just one component of impactful 
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climate change communication. Persuasive messages in many domains often pair efficacy with 
fear. Efficacy and fear are effective individually (e.g., Bandura, 1982; Leventhal, Watts, & 
Pagano, 1967), but together, fear of negative outcomes and the efficacy to prevent them are a 
particularly powerful combination in motivating behavioral change (Tannenbaum et al., 2015). 
Thus, it is reasonable to ask whether climate change efficacy would be even more powerful when 
paired with a scary message about the severe and threatening consequences of climate change.6 
However, the data from Studies 1 through 3 show that our participants are already afraid of 
climate change. The modal response to the question “How scary is climate change?” was 7 (out 
of 7) in all studies. Moreover, the interaction between efficacy (either measured or manipulated) 
and fear significantly predicted intentions or moralization in only one out of 14 such tests (see 
Tables S10 through S23 in the supplemental materials), suggesting that fear did not enhance the 
value of efficacy in climate change action.7 People already fear climate change and, thus, there is 
more to be gained by emphasizing efficacy rather than fear in public communication about 
climate change. 
Conclusion
Climate change is a grave threat that endangers our species’ physical and economic well-
being. Solutions to climate change are still possible but will depend on the actions of millions of 
individuals across the world. According to the EPA, the small behavioral changes described in 
6 Indeed, a pilot study for this research (N = 282) manipulated both efficacy message (High vs. Low) and emotional 
content (Fear vs. Disgust vs. Control) to directly test such an interaction (data and materials for this study are 
included in the online archive). However, we found no difference in fear between conditions (high levels of fear 
across conditions), and so no effect of the emotion manipulations on our critical dependent variables, and no 
interaction between efficacy and emotion on any variables (see Tables S24 through S31 for means, correlations, and 
inferential statistics).
7 Specifically, in Study 3, measured (but not manipulated) Time 1 efficacy interacted with Time 1 fear to predict 
Time 2 Energy Conservation Intentions, an especially unlikely result given no such interaction on Time 1 intentions. 
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our manipulations could eliminate 6 tonnes of carbon emissions per household every year (EPA, 
2013). In American households alone, this would amount 688,566,000 tonnes of CO2, 2% of the 
34 billion tonnes of CO2 emitted globally each year (Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout, & Peters, 
2012). But people can be blinded to the true impact of their own actions by climate change 
helplessness. Breaking its paralyzing hold is critical for real behavioral change and for spreading 
this influence to the behavior of others. Messages that promote efficacy beliefs promote 
moralization and thereby empower people toward these small, but meaningful, actions. 
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Path models linking Climate Change Efficacy (Study 1)/ Efficacy Condition (Studies 2 
and 3) to Energy Conservation Intentions through Climate Change Moralization. For 
Study 3, Efficacy Condition and Climate Change Moralization are always observed at 
Time 1, with Energy Conservation Intentions being observed at either Time 1 or Time 2, 
as indicated. Study 3 a paths vary because of participant attrition between Time 1 and 
Time 2. c = total effect; c' = direct effect; ab = indirect effect. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p 
< .001.
Figure 2. Path model linking Efficacy to Energy Conservation Behavior through Climate Change 
Moralization and Energy Conservation Intentions, Study 3. c = total effect; c' = direct 
effect; a1b1 = indirect effect through Climate Change Moralization only; a2b2 = indirect 
effect through Energy Conservation Intentions only; a1db2 = indirect effect through both 
Climate Change Moralization and Energy Conservation Intentions. † p < .10. * p < .05. 
** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Figure 1 Study 1: c = 0.32***
Study 2: c = 0.15**
Study 3, Time 1: c = 0.28**












Study 1: a = 0.43***
Study 2: a = 0.37**
Study 3, Time 1: a = 0.19*
Study 3, Time 2: a = 0.24*
Study 1: b = 0.62***
Study 2: b = 0.61***
Study 3, Time 1: b = 0.63***
Study 3, Time 2: b = 0.48***
Study 3, Time 1: b = 0.63***
Study 1: c' = 0.05; ab = 0.27 [0.17, 0.39]
Study 2: c' = 0.15; ab = 0.22 [0.07, 0.38]
Study 3, Time 1: c' = 0.15*; ab = 0.12 [0.02, 0.23] 
Study 3, Time 2: c' = -0.06; ab = 0.12 [0.02, 0.23] 



















a1 = 0.24* b2 = 0.09*
c' = 0.04
a1b1 = 0.01 [–0.002, 0.04] 
a2b2 = 0.01 [0.003, 0.03]
a1db2 = 0.02 [0.003, 0.04]
total indirect effect = 0.04 [0.02, 0.08] 
a2 = 0.18* b1 = 0.05
d = 0.62***
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Study 1 N = 145
Climate Change Beliefs 5.34 (1.22)
Climate Change Efficacy 4.24 (1.58)
Negative Emotions 4.85 (1.19)
Climate Change Moralization 4.65 (1.17)
Energy Conservation Intentions 4.61 (1.20)
Political Conservatism 3.28 (1.57)
Study 2 N = 436 N = 217 N = 219
Climate Change Beliefs 5.31 (1.39) 5.24 (1.42) 5.38 (1.36)
Climate Change Efficacy 4.17 (1.94) 3.37 (1.93) 4.96 (1.59)
Negative Emotions 5.11 (1.45) 4.99 (1.48) 5.33 (1.41)
Climate Change Moralization 4.58 (1.31) 4.40 (1.26) 4.76 (1.33)
Energy Conservation Intentions 4.67 (1.23) 4.48 (1.22) 4.85 (1.21)
Climate Change Policies 4.21 (1.85) 4.18 (1.83) 4.24 (1.86)
Political Conservatism 3.42 (1.65) 3.42 (1.65) 3.41 (1.66)
Study 3, Time 1 N = 296 N = 96 N = 105 N = 95
Climate Change Beliefs 5.20 (1.31) 5.26 (1.32) 5.08 (1.29) 5.28 (1.33)
Climate Change Efficacy 4.07 (1.80) 3.17 (1.72) 4.01 (1.58) 5.04 (1.64)
Negative Emotions 5.05 (1.28) 4.93 (1.22) 5.09 (1.32) 5.12 (1.30)
Climate Change Moralization 4.64 (1.18) 4.43 (1.11) 4.68 (1.19) 4.81 (1.20)
Energy Conservation Intentions 4.52 (1.22) 4.25 (1.32) 4.50 (1.14) 4.80 (1.13)
Climate Change Policies 4.18 (1.81) 3.97 (1.61) 4.17 (2.03) 4.41 (1.75)
Energy Conservation Behavior 4.00 (0.30) 3.96 (0.24) 4.00 (0.31) 4.03 (0.33)
Political Conservatism 3.28 (1.69) 3.18 (1.67) 3.54 (1.66) 3.39 (1.75)
Study 3, Time 2 N = 221 N = 71 N = 78 N = 72
Climate Change Beliefs 5.24 (1.24) 5.25 (1.39) 5.15 (1.18) 5.32 (1.17)
Climate Change Efficacy 4.40 (1.60) 3.96 (1.69) 4.40 (1.61) 4.83 (1.39)
Negative Emotions 4.96 (1.40) 4.82 (1.51) 4.98 (1.37) 5.07 (1.33)
Climate Change Moralization 4.66 (1.21) 4.38 (1.22) 4.76 (1.19) 4.83 (1.20)
Energy Conservation Intentions 4.67 (1.14) 4.56 (1.27) 4.77 (1.04) 4.68 (1.11)
Climate Change Policies 4.46 (1.67) 4.39 (1.71) 4.38 (1.68) 4.61 (1.63)
Energy Conservation Behavior 4.37 (0.52) 4.27 (0.52) 4.42 (0.52) 4.43 (0.52)
Note. Climate Change Policies measured on 0 to 7 scale. All other measures on 1 to 7 scales.
